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Since the inception of the federal-state unemployment insurance (UI) system nearly 
sixty years ago, there has been controversy about the adequacy of benefit payments. 1 
Opinions have ranged from the view that UI does little more than subsidize leisure to the 
position that benefit levels grossly undercompensate for the physical and psychic hardships 
caused by unemployment.
The UI system was designed to be completely separate from relief programs, with 
eligibility determined by labor force attachment and benefit levels based on prior earnings 
experience. The benefit objectives of UI were recently set forth by the Advisory Council on 
Unemployment Compensation (1995, p. 8) in a statement of purpose for the UI system.
The most important objective of the U.S. system of unemployment insurance is 
the provision of temporary, partial wage replacement as a matter of right to 
involuntarily unemployed individuals who have demonstrated a prior 
attachment to the labor force. This support should help meet the necessary 
expenses of these workers as they search for employment that takes advantage 
of their skills and experience.
In this statement the Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation makes clear 
that the primary goal of UI is providing compensation for wage loss experienced as a result 
of involuntary unemployment. When making recommendations concerning benefit adequacy 
the Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (1995, p. 20) proposed:
For eligible workers, each state should replace at least 50 percent of lost earnings 
over a six-month period, with a maximum weekly benefit amount equal to two-thirds 
of the state's average weekly wages.
Becker (1960) for an early history of public sentiment on several aspects of UI, and 
Curtin and Ponza (1980) for a summary of some more recent attitudes.
The Council's aim was to ensure one-half wage replacement for a large number of 
beneficiaries.
The most recent major effort to investigate the adequacy of UI was done in the 1970s 
by Paul Burgess and Jerry Kingston (1978a, 1978b) who conducted the Arizona Benefit 
Adequacy Study under the sponsorship of the U.S. Department of Labor. The methodology 
used by Burgess and Kingston closely paralleled that of earlier researchers. 2 The typical 
approach is to question a sample of UI recipients about their expenditures on a class of goods 
and services deemed "necessary" and compare the level of UI benefits to the level of these 
expenses.
Surveys of the type done by Burgess and Kingston, while extremely valuable, have 
proven to be quite expensive. 3 The high cost of gathering data has resulted in small sample 
sizes, but a more fundamental problem exists with the traditional approach. These studies 
presume that the analyst may determine which categories of expenditure are "necessary" or 
which items a household may least do without.
The problems of sample size and expenditure category selection, are both addressed in 
the present study by using a readily available large data set, the Current Population Survey 
(CPS) Annual Demographic File, and an agnostic approach to measuring unemployment 
compensation based on the economic theory of consumer-worker behavior. The methodology 
relies on a natural theoretical approach to estimating the upper limit on unemployment 
compensation solve for the lump sum payment, which, when given to an unemployed 
individual, makes her indifferent between her current lot and her pre-unemployment one.
2Haber and Murray (1966) provide a summary of state studies done in the 1950s which 
used the same basic methodology later used by Blaustein and Mackin (1977) and Burgess and 
Kingston (1978a, 19785).
3 Becker (1961, p.23) noted that for the benefit adequacy studies done in the 1950s "[tjhe 
time spent per interview averaged about three hours, with a range from one to fourteen 
hours, exclusive of the time spent in re-interviews of the more difficult cases."
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Since UI is not intended to fully compensate the loss an individual experiences as a result of 
being unemployed, a financial inducement should remain for returning to work. Knowing 
the upper limit on the level of benefits is important for setting practical program guidelines.
In the next section a discussion of the accepted norms of benefit adequacy provides 
the framework for a review of the literature on assessing benefit adequacy. A simple 
theoretical approach to estimating the upper limit on unemployment compensation is given in 
Section 3 where explicit formulae for performing the computations are also given. In Section 
4 the econometric methods to be used and the samples drawn from the 1992 CPS Annual 
Demographic File are discussed; basic labor supply results are also presented. Simulation 
results for a variety of household types, preference structures, and representative states are 
given in Section 6. The final section presents a summary of the new research findings, 
and considers program guidelines in light of the evidence presented.
2. STANDARDS OF BENEFIT ADEQUACY
In his classic monograph The Adequacy of the Benefit Amount in Unemployment 
Insurance, Father Joseph M. Becker (1961, p. 11) noted that; "A satisfactory norm of 
adequacy must have two elements-one positive, by which it can explain why benefits are as 
large as they are, and one negative, by which it can explain why they are no larger." 
Senator Paul Douglas (1932, p. 885) had earlier stated these principles in more substantive 
form. He suggested that "[t]here is a minimum of life which must be defended by the 
system of benefits," and that H [t]he amounts which the unemployed receive in benefits should 
always be appreciably less than what they would earn if employed [so that]...the temptation 
to shun work in order to draw the benefit will be greatly reduced" (Douglas 1932, p. 4). 
Douglas proposed that a balancing of these objectives might be achieved if unemployment 
benefits were to replace approximately one-half of lost wages for individuals who are unem 
ployed and have demonstrated a significant attachment to the labor force.
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While federal law has never specified the exact rate at which lost wages must be 
replaced under UI, every president since Eisenhower has reaffirmed the position that 
"payments to the great majority of the beneficiaries should equal at least half of regular 
earnings" (Becker 1980, p. 11). The Nixon administration specified that great majority 
should mean four-fifths of the nation's workforce (Becker 1980, p. 11). This criterion of 
benefit adequacy has come to be known as one-half for four-fifths.
2.1 The Wage Replacement Ratio: An Aggregate Criterion
While most states have benefit formula intended to replace approximately one-half of 
lost wages, the maximum on payments guarantees that many high wage workers will receive 
less than half their average lost earnings, and the minimum means that some low wage 
workers may receive more than half their average earnings. The data in Table 1 summarize 
the national historical experience on benefit adequacy using a very aggregate measure the 
average wage replacement ratio (WRR). The national average WRR is defined by:
n




E WE / m
where, WBAj = the weekly benefit amount received by the ith UI
recipient,
n = the number of UI recipients,
WEj = the weekly earnings of the jth covered worker, and
m = the number of workers covered by UI.
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In the first few years of UI, earnings of covered workers were unusually low, and the 
WRR was quite high. This is why there was little controversy about the adequacy of the 
weekly benefit amount until earnings rose rapidly after World War II. Figure 1 shows the 
declining trend of the WRR through the early 1950s. Since that time the WRR has ranged 
between thirty-two and thirty-seven percent, being approximately thirty-six percent in recent 
years.
Figure 1 which also shows a general upward trend in the WRR since about 1950. 
Controlling for the changing occupational mix of UI claimants, Hight (1980) arrived at lower 
bound estimates of 0.10 to 0.29 percent increase in the WRR per year over the period 
1950-1977; and concluded that there has been some real gains in adequacy over the period. 
Table 2 lists the WRR for each state in 1994. While the national WRR was 36.05 percent in 
1994, WRRs across the states ranged from a low of 26.8 percent in California to a high of 
53.7 percent in Hawaii. A total of 18 states had WRRs greater than 40 percent in 1994.
Presumably the WRR is used as a rough gauge of benefit adequacy because the data 
needed to compute it is readily available. It is the main measure of benefit adequacy 
regularly reported by the U.S. Department of Labor.4 However, the WRR as computed by 
the formula given above is a bit misleading. The denominator in the WRR considers wages 
for the entire population of covered workers, while the numerator considers only payments to
4 It is reported by the U.S. Department of Labor quarterly in UI Data Summary and 
annually in updates to UI Financial Data, ET Handbook No. 394.
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beneficiaries. Properly, we should examine benefit payments relative to lost earnings of 
beneficiaries.
Wayne Vroman (1980) who provided a comprehensive review of possible wage 
replacement rate computations called the series presented in Figure 1 and Tables 1 and 2 a 
gross narrow wage replacement ratio which is the one used historically. He also cited 
criticism that the measure underestimates the "true" replacement ratio because "unemployed 
workers receive lower wages than the average worker covered by the program."5 Using 
unpublished micro data on the actual pre-unemployment earnings of beneficiaries from 
Illinois, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin for various periods 
during the 1980s, the Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (1995, p. 138) 
estimated that the gross narrow computation understates the true wage replacement rates by 
25 to 30 percentage points.
The dramatic difference in wage replacement ratio estimates computed by the rather 
misleading gross narrow WRR formula and those produced using micro data on actual 
benefits and prior earnings convinced the Unemployment Compensation Advisory Council 
(1995, p. 21) to recommend that:
The U.S. Department of Labor should calculate and report the actual replacement rate 
for individuals who receive Unemployment Insurance. This replacement rate should
Vroman (1980, p. 170).
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be calculated by dividing the weekly benefits paid to individuals by the average 
weekly earnings paid to those individuals prior to unemployment.
Vroman (1980, p. 170-72) reported that some researchers using micro data have 
arrived at very high net WRR figures. Feldstein (1974), who was concerned with the 
adverse incentive effects of UI, estimated that the net wage replacement ratio is often more 
than seventy percent. Munts and Garfmkel (1974) found replacement rates in Ohio in 
1971-1972 to range from .38 to .89 for several distinct types of family units. Corson et al. 
(1977), determined the average ratio of benefits to lost wages in 1977 to be .66.
However, when broader measures of macro wage replacement which consider 
uncovered workers and non-compensated weeks are computed, replacement rates are much 
lower. For example Gramlich (1974), found that during the 1970-1971 recession for families 
headed by men, UI replaced only six to eight percent of lost earnings, and fourteen to 
eighteen percent for families headed by women. While the gross narrow WRR for 1971 was 
0.363, Edgell and Wandner (1974) estimated the macro replacement rate for UI in the United 
States economy to be as low as 20 percent.
The wage replacement ratio estimates produced in the 1970s also varied because of 
differential treatment of taxes in the computations. This was a very important issue prior to 
the 1986 federal income tax changes which placed income received as unemployment 
compensation benefits in the same category for taxation as income from labor earnings.
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2.2 Meeting Essential Expenditures: Support for the Standard
During the 1950s the U.S. Department of Labor financed a series of Unemployment 
Insurance benefit adequacy studies. The results of these studies have been summarized by 
Becker (1961), Lester (1962), and Haber and Murray (1966). Becker (1980), while 
discussing the principles which should underlie any proposal for a federal benefit standard, 
focused on the evidence from studies in Tampa, Fla. (1956), Anderson, S.C. (1957), 
Albany, N.Y. (1957), Portland, Ore. (1958), and St. Louis, Mo. (1958). These five similar 
studies were based on retrospective data on the income and expenditures of respondents 
during the period just prior to the survey date. Expenditures were divided into deferrable 
and non-deferrable categories. Spending on food, clothing, medical care, and housing 
constituted the non-deferrable group. Information was gathered on four household types. 
After examining these studies Becker (1980, p. 26) concluded that "[njone of the states came 
close to the proposed goal of paying 80 percent of the beneficiaries half or more of their 
gross wage,...[and] [i]t is one of the weaknesses of the system that claimants without 
dependents' are treated much better than claimants with dependents." He suggested that 
benefit adequacy could be generally improved if benefit maximums were raised and programs 
for dependents allowances were expanded.
To give some examples from the 1950s studies, Table 3 presents a summary of the 
experience of those who fared best under the existing programs-households composed of a 
single beneficiary living alone. Becker (1961) found that benefits amounted to two-thirds or
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more of the income of unemployed single beneficiaries, more than 50 percent of family 
income for families with one wage earner, 40 percent for families with two wage earners and 
about 20 percent for families of secondary age earners. The 1950s studies demonstrated the 
usefulness of the one-half wage norm for assessing benefit adequacy. On the average, 
benefits that were half or more of the wage were sufficient to cover non-deferrable expenses 
for all claimant household types (Becker 1980, p. 13).
The deferrable/non-deferrable distinction used in the 1950s studies was expanded by 
Blaustein and Mackin (1977). They added expenditures made on a regular basis to repay 
outstanding debt to expenditures for food, clothing, medical care and housing, and labeled 
this "recurring" expenses. Using this concept as a basis for evaluating UI benefit adequacy 
they found that over two-thirds of the beneficiary households in South Carolina had adequate 
income in 1977. Nonetheless, they recommended increasing benefit maximums to improve 
adequacy.
Burgess and Kingston (1978a, 1978b) who conducted a detailed benefit adequacy 
study in Arizona, expanded the Blaustein-Mackin definition of recurring expenses to include 
expenditures on transportation, insurance, regular services, and regular support payments. 
They labeled this concept "necessary and obligated" expenses, and used it to assess benefit 
adequacy for seven recipient household types. The Arizona study revealed a wide disparity 
in terms of how closely benefits came to meeting the 10 necessary and obligated expenses for 
different categories of beneficiaries. As in the previous studies, the two most important
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factors, in addition to the weekly benefit amount, in determining the economic condition of 
the family during unemployment were the number of members to be supported and the 
number who were contributing to the support.
Burgess and Kingston found that benefits were most adequate for beneficiaries who 
had no other household members and lived with relatives~44 percent received a benefit equal 
to 100 percent or more of their share of the 10 expenses. The next most adequate category 
was husband and wife units in which both members worked. For 23.4 percent, the benefit 
amount represented 100 percent or more of expenses. Benefits were least adequate for 
beneficiaries in three or more person households in which the beneficiary was the only 
earner. For only 2.3 percent did the weekly benefit amount cover 100 percent or more of 
their expenses. For a majority of this category (56.1 percent), the benefit was half or less of 
the expenditures.
The low maximum weekly benefit amount was the principal reason for the disparity in 
the benefit-expense ratios among the different categories of Arizona beneficiaries studied. 
Sole wage earners, in households with two or more members including a spouse, generally 
had the highest wages and, consequently, were most often cut off by the maximum. For 
those beneficiaries, the weekly benefit amount-usually the $85 maximum was less adequate 
than for any other category of beneficiary.
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The Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (1995, p. 132) investigated 
whether states provided adequate UI benefits using data from the 1992 Consumer 
Expenditure Survey. Applying the narrow definition of necessary expenses used by Blaustein 
and Mackin (1977), the Advisory Council found that a majority of states provide UI 
compensation adequate to cover expenses for households with annual incomes in the $20,000 
to $40,000 range. Very few state UI systems provided income replacement sufficient to 
meet the broader definition of Burgess and Kingston (1978).
Grossman (1973), Hamermesh (1982) and Gruber (1994a) have directly investigated 
how UI payments influence expenditure by unemployed workers. Grossman found that 
unemployed persons substitute leisure for market goods in an attempt to maintain customary 
consumption levels. Hamermesh concluded that UI benefits only partly help smooth 
consumption during periods of lost earnings due to unemployment, and that as much as half 
of the benefits received are spent as if "individuals were fully able to borrow or had 
sufficient savings to meet transitory losses of income without any disruption in their 
consumption spending."6 Gruber estimated that in the absence of UI, average consumption 
expenditure by unemployed persons would fall by 22 %, or more than three times the decline 
estimated in the presence of UI. 7
6 Hamermesh (1982, p. 110).
7 Gruber (1994, p. 30).
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The consumer expenditure studies also raise a question about the importance of UI in 
maintaining necessary expenditure. Gruber (1994b) investigated this question using two 
sources of microeconomic consumer expenditure data. Results based on both the Panel Study 
of Income Dynamics (PSID) and the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES) "suggest that UI 
has a significant effect on consumption of the unemployed." 8 On a finer point evidence 
from the two data sets differed. The PSID results indicated UI is indispensable for 
unemployed workers trying to maintain necessary expenditure, while the CES suggested that 
other forms of consumption insurance, such as savings and earnings of other household 
members, are at least as important as UI benefits.
2.3 Optimal Unemployment Insurance: A Theoretical Approach
Baily (1978) and Flemming (1978) originated theoretical models of optimal 
unemployment insurance. The models are similar in that both attempt to solve for 
characteristics of the UI system which would maximize the expected lifetime utility of a 
representative worker. The UI program choice parameters for this problem are the wage 
replacement rate, and the potential duration of benefits. Both Baily and Flemming assume an 
infinite potential duration of benefits, and each determines that optimal replacement rates are 
in the range of those provided by the states. Baily (1978, p. 393) finds that:
Gruber (1995, p. 31).
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[that if the] degree of relative risk aversion by workers [is] unity, and if workers do 
not prolong their duration of unemployment very much as a result of UI payments 
[i.e., if the elasticity of a spell of unemployment with respect to a change in the 
benefit amount is about 0.15] then if the benefit-wage ratio is 50% it is about right.
The elasticity of unemployment with respect to the benefit amount assumed by Baily (1978) 
is in line with estimates summarized in Chapter 7.
Flemming qualifies his statements with capital market considerations. He concludes 
that under perfect capital markets a replacement rate of 50% is too high, and "[i]f there is no 
lending or borrowing the optimal rates rise to about 75 %. "9
Davidson and Woodbury (1995, p. 1) examine optimal UI with "an equilibrium 
search and matching model calibrated using data from the reemployment bonus experiments 
and secondary sources." Like Baily and Flemming they find that if potential UI duration 
were infinite replacement rates should optimally be 50%. However, Davidson and 
Woodbury also estimate that if potential duration is limited to the standard 26 weeks, then 
the UI system should optimally replace all of lost earnings.
Flemming (1978, p. 403).
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2.4 Econometric Approaches: Applying Theory
Burgess and Kingston (1980) investigated the possibility of evaluating benefit 
adequacy on the basis of readily available survey (Continuous Wage and Benefit History- 
-CWBH) and claims data. They conclude, however, "that information on income and 
household composition must be supplemented with actual or estimated data on household 
expenditure patterns to predict individual benefit adequacy values with a reasonable degree of 
accuracy" (U.S. Department of Labor 1981, p. 43). Other writers have presented results 
which suggest a greater potential for econometric methods to yield reasonable estimates of 
adequate UI compensation.
Ashenfelter (1980), in the context of a household model where unemployment is 
treated as a rationing constraint, developed an approximation to a quantity which he refers to 
(Ashenfelter 1980, p.552) as the "lump-sum compensation required to restore the unem 
ployed [rationed] worker's family to the welfare level of the fully employed family." This 
approximation is arrived at by taking a second-order Taylor Series approximation of the 
difference between the exogenous cost of achieving the unconstrained utility level in the 
presence of the ration and the cost of achieving the same level in the absence of any 
constraint, around the fully employed point. The result is "a conventional Harberger (1971) 
type triangle measure of welfare loss" (Ashenfelter 1980, p. 553), which is applied to aggre 
gate time series data.
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Kurd (1980), who examined the cost of unemployment to the unemployed, used a 
hybrid of approximation and direct methods to examine the experience of respondents to the 
1967 Survey of Economic Opportunity. He estimated the parameters of a Taylor Series 
approximation of the substitution effect of a wage change on hours of work, integrated to 
find the compensated labor supply function, solved for the utility constant wage acceptance 
locus by inversion, and then determined the required lump sum compensation to constrained 
individuals by evaluating the area under this locus between the actual (constrained) and fully 
employed levels of labor supply.
O'Leary (1990) estimated the lump-sum compensation required to restore a single 
unemployed person with no dependents to the welfare level of a fully employed worker using 
a second-order Taylor Series approximation. 10 Results presented in Ashenfelter (1980), 
Kurd (1980), and O'Leary (1990) all suggest that the current UI practice of replacing one- 
half lost wages tends to overcompensate short spells of unemployment and undercompensate 
long spells.
2.5 A Consensus Standard
The norm of adequacy one-half for four-fifths is rooted in the common-sense 
recommendations of economists and politicians made over fifty years ago. The norm has
10This paper draws heavily on arguments and results presented in O'Leary (1986, 1990). 
Those previous studies of UI benefit adequacy focused on single workers without dependents.
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been demonstrated to correspond roughly to the fundamental concern of satisfying needs of 
the unemployed, as well as being consistent with the fiscal integrity of the program. It is 
also appealing to policy makers and program managers because it is easy to apply. In the 
final section this norm is reviewed in light of full unemployment compensation estimates. 
The theoretical foundation for this exercise is laid in the next section.
3. A THEORETICAL APPROACH TO FULL UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
If the notion of a representative structure for individual preferences can be accepted, a 
method for directly evaluating the required compensation to an individual constrained in 
selling labor services is immediate. The method developed here is based on just such an 
assumption and is in the spirit of work by Rosen (1978), who examined the excess burden of 
income taxation, and Hurd and Pencavel (1981), who evaluated various wage subsidy 
programs.
3.1 Consumer Behavior with Employment Constraints
Satisfaction of each consumer-worker is represented as depending simply on the 
market resources at her command, Y, and the time available to enjoy these resources, L. It 
is assumed that each individual, given her exogenous non-labor income, I, and the rate at
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which she can transform labor services, H, into income, w, if unconstrained in the labor 
market, acts in a manner consistent with the problem:
max { U(L,Y); Y = wH + I } = V(L(w,I), Y(w,I)). (1) 
L,Y
She reaches an optimum where H(w,I) hours of work are supplied to the market and Y(w,I) 
goods are consumed in her residual discretionary time, L(w,I). Denoting T as the 
endowment of discretionary time, L(w,I) = T - H(w,I). In (1) V(w,I) is the indirect utility 
function, it represents the maximum level of satisfaction for given values of w and I.
While the above exposition is stated in terms of individual behavior, the question of 
appropriate unemployment compensation is best seen from the household perspective. To 
provide this viewpoint we follow the usual approach found in the economics literature as 
summarized by Shelly Lundberg (1988, p. 225):
The most common empirical specification of family labor supply treats the 
work hours of married men as independent of the behavior or attributes of 
their wives and the husband's behavior, in turn, as exogenous with respect to 
the wife's work decision. Husband and wife maximize utility independently, 
with the wife treating husband's earnings as property income. This results in 
an asymmetric pair of labor supply functions [as stated below] with no cross 
equation restrictions.
Using the above notation and denoting subscripts for married males and females as m and f 
respectively, the following are labor supply equations for a household with a married couple
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where both partners work in the market: H,,, = Hm(wm ,I) and Hf = Hf(wf,I + wmHJ. 
Under these assumptions the analysis of unemployment compensation to individuals in a 
household context may proceed using the model for individual consumer-worker behavior.
In many instances, the effective choice facing a consumer-worker is between working 
a standard day, week, or year or not working at all; in other cases an optimal wage-hour 
arrangement way be upset by an unexpected layoff. The analytic techniques required to 
investigate the effects of labor market constraints on consumer-worker behavior are formally 
similar to the methods used to evaluate the response to "straight rationing." Research on the 
effects of rationing began during World War II (see Rothbarth 1940-41, and Kaldor 1941) 
and has continued since (see Tobin-Houthakker 1950-51, Pollack 1971, and Neary and 
Roberts 1980).
Ashenfelter (1980) developed a model of household labor supply under rationing. 
This model has been applied by Blundell and Walker (1982), Deaton and Muellbauer (1981), 
Kneisner (1976), Parsons (1977), and Ransom (1987). Ham (1982) presented results based 
on a model of individual labor supply under rationing.
An individual faced with a binding constraint on the hours that he may sell in the 
labor market at, say, H < H(w,I) = T - L(w,I), achieves a utility level less than that 
attainable in the absence of the labor market constraint,
U(T - H, wH + I) < U(L(w, I), Y(w, I)), (2) 
or in terms of the indirect utility function,
Y(H, wH + I) < V(w, I). (3)
Full unemployment compensation to an individual who is constrained in selling labor services 
is that lump sum grant, c, which solves:
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U(T - H, wH + I + c) = U(L(w,I), Y(w, I)). (4) 
Stating this condition in terms of the indirect utility function,
Y(H, wH + I + c) = V(w, I), (5)
where c is a Hicksian equivalent variation. It is the lump sum compensation required by an 
individual who is constrained in the labor market to make him as well off as if he were 
employed at equilibrium hours without any change in relative prices. Therefore
c = c(w, I, H) (6)
is the compensation he would need to forego an opportunity to be employed at equilibrium 
hours.
The concept of full compensation embodied in this approach may be easily understood 
by referring to the indifference curve analysis of Figure 2. An unconstrained individual, 
with preferences as represented by the map of indifference curves on Figure 2, would reach 
an unconstrained optimum equilibrium on U  at (L ,Y ). If, for some reason, market 
opportunities allow sales of only H = T - L1 hours of labor services, a lower level of utility 
is reached on U1 at (L^Y 1 ). While there is a hardship experienced as a result of the 
associated earnings loss (Y  - Y 1 ), the utility loss is partly compensated by an increase in 
leisure, and the income required to fully compensate the constrained individual (Y - Y1) is 
less than the earnings loss.
3.1 Explicit Formulae for Computing Full Compensation
The approach to measuring full compensation proceeds from the estimation of a 
representative labor supply function. To compute an exact solution for full compensation 
utility function parameter estimates are required. For the model presented above, when the
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theoretical conditions required by neoclassical economic theory are satisfied utility function 
parameters can be recovered from estimation of a labor supply specification.
Deriving an explicit closed form solution to (6) is not always an easy matter. Two 
utility functions are used in this study, they are the familiar Stone-Geary (SG) which has 
been used widely in employment policy research, and the somewhat less familiar utility 
function derived by Hausman (1980) from the linear labor supply function. To crystalize the 
approach, the Stone-Geary case is now worked out in detail.
3.1.1 Full Compensation when Utility is Stone-Geary
The Linear Expenditure System is derived from the Stone-Geary utility function: 
U(L,Y) = ofln(L - 7, - A) + (1 - «)ln(Y - 72); 0 < a < 1, (7)
where the parameters a and (1 - a) are interpreted as marginal budget shares devoted to 
leisure and market goods, and yl and y2 represent leisure and income origin translation 
parameters respectively, and A = 5D with D the number of dependents and d the effect of 
each dependent on the origin where leisure is defined. Maximizing (7) subject to the 
income, Y = wH + I, and time, T = H + L constraints yields leisure demand,
L = 7l + («/w)((wT + I) - w(7l + A) - 72), (8a) 
or labor supply,
H = (T - Tl) - (ce/w)(I + w(T - 7l - A) - 72), (8b) 
and commodity demand,
Y = 72 + (1 - «)((wT + I) - w(7l + A) - 72), (8c)
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functions. Given the adding up condition on neoclassical demand functions, the parameters 
of (8a) through (8c) can be determined by estimating the parameters of any one of the 
demand system equations. Denoting the estimated parameter values by the parameters 
themselves, substitution of (8a) and (8c) into the right-hand side of (4) yields the right-hand 
side of equation (5),
[r- (l-a)w(r-Yl -A)-a(/-Y2)
-Y2 ] X [(l-a){w(r-yi -A) + (/-Yj)}]1 "1
the indirect Stone-Geary utility function. For this case the left-hand side of (5) is:
vd-«) (10)
Equating (9) and (10) and solving for c yields:
c = Y 2 -/-wff+d-a) {w(T-Yl -A) + (/-Y2)} X
a closed form solution for full unemployment compensation when utility is Stone-Geary.
3.1.2 Full Compensation when Labor Supply is Linear
Hausman (1980) has shown that when labor supply takes the following linear form:
H = aw + 51 + Zy, (12)
with the variables H, w and I as defined above, Z representing socioeconomic variables such 
as the number of dependents and ce, 8 and 7 being parameters to estimate, the indirect utility 
function satisfying neoclassical conditions is:
V(w, I) = e5w{I + (a/5)w - (a/52) + (s/5)},
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(13)
where, s = Zy, and the direct utility function consistent with the linear labor supply is:
U(L, Y) = e't 1 + 5 <Y + gXb - H>3{(H - b)/S}, (14)
where b = a/6 and § = (s/5) - (a/52). In a different paper Hausman (1981) showed how 
these specifications may be used to compute exact welfare measures at the individual level. 
In the present case full compensation when labor supply is constrained to be H < H(w, I) is 
the Hicksian equivalent variation, c, which may be computed by the following formula:
{5w + [1 + 6(wH + I + S)(b - H)]} + ln{(51 + bw5 - b + s)/(H - b)} 
c   
(-5(b - H)) (15)
4. SAMPLES, METHODS, AND BASIC ESTIMATION RESULTS
4.1 The Samples
The basic estimation was performed on samples from the 1992 Current Population 
Survey (CPS) Annual Demographic File. These data were collected in March of 1992, and 
describe respondent behavior during 1991.
This study ultimately examines what full UI compensation might be for workers in 
twelve different household situations. Six different categories of household member were 
examined in households with and without dependents. A total of 33,454 households were 
used for the basic estimations. This included:
11,739 households with married couples where both partners worked, 
6,153 households with married couples where only the husband worked, 
2,505 households with married couples where only the wife worked, 
6,031 households with a single male working person, and 
7,026 households with a single female working person.
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Parameters of the preference structure were estimated for one person in each of the 
last four household types listed above, and for both partners among married couples where 
both worked. This results in workers who were in six different categories of household 
membership.
To arrive at this sample for analysis we eliminated households with earners aged less 
than 25 or more than 55 years, and examined only workers with positive earnings sometime 
during 1991. We also excluded households with more than two earners. Among households 
without a married couple we examined only those where there was one earner.
One of the most interesting aspects of household structure for our purposes is the 
dependents relationships. There was an average of 1.4 dependents in households with 
married couples where both partners worked and married couples with only the husband 
working. In households with a married couple and only the wife working the average was 
0.9 dependents, while there was an average 0.2 dependents for single males and 0.7 
dependents for single females. In addition to information on dependents, the mean values of 
annual hours worked, hourly wages, age, education, race, and urban residence status are 
presented in Table 4. Not surprisingly the samples show that workers in households with 
married couples and only one worker average about ten years older than households with 
married couples where both partners work, also the sample containing the largest fraction of 
black households are those where there is a single woman working.
The family non-labor income figure of $34,953, for wives in households where 
married spouses both work reflects the assumption that Shelly Lundberg (1988, p. 225) says 
is "the most common empirical specification "--labor income of husbands is regarded by 
working wives as part of exogenous income. The relative size of the means to the standard 
deviations of family non-labor income for the sub-samples indicates that for some households 
non-labor income is negative. This is because the CPS household non-labor income variable 
includes self-employment income and rental income, each of which may reasonably be 
negative in a given year.
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Given the great diversity of American households, the sample selection restrictions 
are admittedly severe. However, even within the five narrowly defined household types 
examined there are many different dependent relationships so that the categories of household 
member multiply quickly. Assigning dependency relationships and non-labor income 
becomes quite complicated for other household structures. Not every possible combination 
can be examined; information yielded from examination of the household categories selected 
is rich and varied.
4.2 Estimation Methods
The parameter estimates which serve as the basis for compensation simulations are 
reported in Table 5. The equations estimated are similar in that each has a very small 
coefficient of determination. This is typical when estimating labor supply equations on cross- 
section data. While several omitted factors obviously explain the total variation in annual 
hours worked, every individual parameter in these equations is estimated with a high degree 
of statistical significance. Furthermore, these estimates are quite robust, being relatively 
invariant when other regressors were included. The parsimonious specifications were chosen 
for simplicity.
The labor supply specifications (8b) and (12) were each estimated on the six different 
samples of workers described above. The labor supply equations were estimated using 
ordinary least squares, correcting for the division bias problem involved in defining the 
hourly wage rate using the method proposed by Borjas (1980). In the labor supply 
regression equations the dependent variable, annual hours, is defmitionally related to the 
important predictor, the hourly wage rate, since the latter is defined by dividing the former 
into annual earnings. To avoid the bias in parameter estimates which may result from 
division bias, first stage wage equations are run. Results of these estimations are reported in 
Table 6. All parameters in the wage equations were estimated with great precision, and 
overall the equations fit the data quite well. Wages were modeled as depending on age, 
education, race and urban residency status. These predictor variables were not later included
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in the hours equations so as to satisfy identification of the system and to avoid 
multicollinearity with the predicted wage.
All results in this study are based on empirical labor supply equations, which include 
only variables suggested by the theory which in this case includes the number of dependents. 
The number of dependents was incorporated into the two utility functions examined since 
dependency status is an important consideration in estimating UI benefit adequacy.
4.3 Basic Estimation Results
The direct utility function (14) derived by Hausman (1980) suggests no natural 
interpretations of the parameters estimated for the linear labor supply function and presented 
in Table 5. Interpretation of these results is limited to discussion of elasticities. On the 
other hand there are natural interpretations of the parameters of the Stone-Geary labor supply 
function reported in Table 7.
The budget share devoted to leisure is greatest for married males and single female 
workers. The complementary group of married women and single men, who have relatively 
lower valued market uses of time, have relatively higher minimum leisure requirements. 
Estimated minimum income requirements are large and negative for all groups. As 
mentioned earlier negative values are possible because the exogenous household income 
variable includes losses from self employment and rental property. The relative magnitudes 
of the estimated y2 across household types are reasonable. Working married males in one 
earner households have the highest subsistence income requirements, while married women 
in dual earner households have the lowest requirement. 11
"Following the usual practice in the literature (Lundberg, 1988, p. 225) of adding 
husbands earnings to working wives non-labor income, as seen in Table 4, married women in 
dual earner households also have the greatest mean and standard deviation in exogenous non- 
labor income. This obviously drives the y2 estimate.
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The labor supply equation estimates presented in Table 5 indicate that dependents 
increase hours of labor supplied by men, and decrease hours offered to the market by 
women. These results are given a finer interpretation in Table 7 where estimates for 5, the 
Stone-Geary utility function parameter indicating the minimum leisure required per 
dependent, are reported. The estimates indicate that an additional dependent reduces the 
minimum leisure required by a working woman with a working spouse by 119 hours per 
year, while increasing the minimum leisure required by married men whose spouse does not 
work by 123 hours per year.
Estimates of the structural Cournot (uncompensated) wage effect, income effect, 
substitution effect, and associated elasticities are presented in Table 8 for the Stone-Geary 
form and Table 9 for the Linear form. The labor supply estimation results are most easily 
reviewed in elasticity terms. For both the Stone-Geary and the Linear specifications, the 
elasticity estimates are consistent with the implication of consumer demand theory that the 
substitution effect on labor supply is positive. Furthermore, in each case leisure is found to 
be a normal good. Generally speaking, the Stone-Geary specification yields results more 
consistent with the received literature. The Linear form results in a relatively high labor 
supply elasticity for married men who are the sole earner in the household, this group is 
usually found to have the least elastic labor supply. Using the Stone-Geary specification, the 
labor supply elasticity estimate of married male sole earners falls to less than half that from 
the linear specification. Other estimates generated from the Stone-Geary model are also 
more in line with previous studies.
5. ESTIMATES OF FULL UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
In this section full compensation estimates based on the formulae (11) and (15) given 
in Section 3 are presented for various hypothetical degrees of labor market constraint. These 
figures are reported together with UI payment simulation results for four states having 
benefit computation provisions which span the variety of systems extant and an estimate of 
compensation which would result if one-half of lost wages were replaced which is the 
standard norm of adequacy.
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Under all state Unemployment Insurance (UI) laws, a claimant's benefit rights 
depend on four principal factors: "the amount of employment and wages required to 
qualify an individual for benefits, the period for earning such wages, the method of 
computing the weekly benefit amount, and the method of determining the length of time 
for which benefits may be paid." 12 Another factor which is an important determinant of 
benefits in 14 states is dependents allowances. While the level of wages and period of 
employment for qualification differ greatly across the states, there exist only four basic 
schemes for determining a UI claimant's weekly benefit amount. They are referred to as 
the Average-weekly-wage, High-quarter, Multi-quarter, and Annual-wage formulae.
Results of simple simulations, performed under the assumption of qualification for 
the maximum benefit payment period, are presented for state programs representative of 
each of the four benefit schemes: Michigan provisions are used to perform Average-week 
ly-wage simulations, Massachusetts laws provide the parameters to do High-quarter 
simulations, Illinois serves as an example of a Multi-quarter state, and Oregon's scheme is 
used to generate Annual-wage simulations. The particulars of the four categories of 
benefit rights provisions in each of these states are summarized in Table 10. The third 
section of the table highlights the distinguishing characteristics of the four different state 
benefit schemes. Under each scheme a formula is employed which yields a weekly benefit 
amount (WBA) which is equal to about one-half of lost gross wages. Under the Michigan 
plan seventy percent of the net AWW is paid; in Massachusetts a fraction between 1/21 
and 1/26 of the HQ earnings is the WBA 13 ; in Illinois 49 percent of earnings in the two 
highest quarters in the base period divided by 26; and in Oregon the WBA is 1.25 percent 
of annual income.
^Comparison of State UI Laws, U.S. Department of Labor (1992, p. 3-1).
13The fraction 1/26 is used in the Massachusetts simulations because the statutory 
alternative of 1/52 of the highest two quarters yields the same WBA in our simulations since 
we use average quarterly earnings computed as annual earnings divided by four.
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Tables 11-16 present simulation results for the four states, the one-half wage 
replacement rule, and for the two preference structures considered. Each table is divided 
into two parts, the left hand panel gives results for workers with no dependents, the right 
hand panel gives results for workers with two dependents. In each table the left most 
column lists the hypothetical number of weeks of unemployment (Weeks), which is 
allowed to range from one to thirty-one because among the simulation states the maximum 
entitled duration of regular benefits is 30 weeks in Massachusetts which also has a one 
week waiting period. The next four columns report the cumulative benefit payments 
which would be made to a qualified claimant in Michigan, Massachusetts, Illinois, and 
Oregon with the various weeks of unemployment, and sub-sample average gross hourly 
wages for the six categories of worker reported in Table 4. Column six reports a dollar 
amount which equals half of the total gross wages lost by a worker with the mean wage 
rate, and mean non-labor income. The seventh and eighth columns present the amount of 
"full" compensation implied by the closed form direct compensation formula for the Stone- 
Geary and Linear specifications respectively. The right panel in each table presents 
similar simulation results with the change that the hypothetical worker has two dependents 
instead of none.
In Michigan there is no waiting period before benefit payments begin. However, in 
Massachusetts, Illinois and Oregon the benefit payment is zero during the first full week of 
unemployment, with this waiting period acting as a form of coinsurance. The one-week 
waiting period was required in all but eleven states in 1991. 14 In all states, once benefit 
payments commence, total benefits increase in a linear fashion, with a fixed benefit 
amount being paid each week, until there is either a return to work or the claimant is no 
longer eligible. The one-half wage replacement rule results in a fixed benefit payment 
each week as well.
14The other ten states without a waiting week in 1991 were: Alabama, Connecticut, 
Delaware, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Nevada, New Hampshire, Virginia, and Wisconsin.
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It is assumed in the simulations performed here that the stylized claimant 
considered qualifies for the maximum benefit period. In the absence of economic 
conditions which trigger extended benefits, 26 weeks is the maximum benefit duration 
under most UI programs. 15 As a consequence of the waiting period and the benefit 
maximums, the figures in the simulation tables for Illinois and Oregon are constant for 
weeks of unemployment beyond twenty-seven, for Michigan there is no change after 26 
weeks because Michigan has a maximum entitlement of 26 weeks and no waiting week, 
cumulative compensation reaches a maximum in Massachusetts after 31 weeks. Just as the 
UI benefit totals increase in a linear fashion, so do the totals for one-half gross wage 
replacement (HALF).
In the simulations the generally accepted norm of benefit adequacy--one-half wage 
replacement---is met or slightly exceeded in all four states for workers with relatively low 
earnings. That is for the three categories of woman worker. The mean hourly wages 
across the three groups of woman worker were all approximately equal to $10.50, while 
the mean hourly wages for men were somewhat higher. The mean wages for both 
categories of married men, single earner ($16.47) and dual earner ($14.89) households, 
were too high to allow the average worker to qualify for half wage replacement in any of 
the states. However, single males who had mean hourly earnings of $13.24 would be 
provided with approximately half wage replacement when unemployed in either Michigan 
or Massachusetts. Naturally, in the simulations the waiting week delays wage replacement 
in Massachusetts, Illinois, and Oregon, but not in Michigan.
Differentiating each compensation formula with respect to hours, H, reveals that it 
is in general impossible to determine a priori how a change in hours of work affects utility 
based compensation. Comparing simulation results for "full" compensation from the 
theoretical formulae based on Stone-Geary and integrated Linear utility, with the figures 
for the actual benefit payments which would be forthcoming in the various states, the
15The exceptions (maximum duration in weeks) are: Louisiana (28), Massachusetts (30), 
Pennsylvania (30), Puerto Rico (20), Utah (36), Virginia (28), Washington, D.C. (34), and 
West Virginia (28).
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general result is that current UI programs appear to overcompensate for wage loss during 
the first several weeks of unemployment and undercompensate for lengthy spells of 
unemployment.
The Stone-Geary form yields full compensation simulation estimates which nearly 
coincide with the one-half wage replacement rule for long durations of unemployment, but 
suggests that the states and the half-wage replacement formula is too generous in early 
weeks of unemployment.
Results based on the Linear form of labor supply generally accentuate the 
tendencies of the Stone-Geary simulation suggesting that compensation should be lower 
than the accepted norm in early weeks. However, for long durations of unemployment the 
Linear form suggests that compensation may safely be much higher than one-half wage 
replacement.
For a few categories of worker, simulation results based on the theoretical formulae 
have a surprising non-monotonic shape. For working husbands with non-working wives 
the pattern is exhibited for both the Stone-Geary and the Linear based formulae for men 
both with and without other dependents. For the Stone-Geary form the pattern is also 
apparent for single men with two dependents, and for the Linear form the pattern appears 
for married women workers with a working spouse and two dependents. In all of these 
cases the pattern is generally the same full compensation in the first week of 
unemployment should be positive though not large, with cumulative full compensation 
declining for additional weeks of unemployment until it reaches zero in the early weeks of 
a spell and then rises thereafter. These results occur because of the non-linear form of the 
compensation formulae and the relative magnitude of the parameter estimates. The 
estimates suggest that the timing of benefit payments should be closely examined. 
Ignoring possible entry effects which may be created, the results suggest that the waiting 
period might be placed after the first weeks of compensation.
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It is surprising that results on dependents allowances from the theoretical 
compensation formulae are not more consistent given that the dependents variable in the 
labor supply equations yielded the usual results found in the literature independent of the 
household structure, because of strong income effects for men dependents tend to increase 
hours of market work for males, and perhaps because they more significantly raise the 
opportunity cost of working for women; dependents decrease hours of market work for 
females. For the Stone-Geary form adding dependents to the household lowers required 
full compensation for men and raises full compensation required for women, while 
precisely the opposite occurs for the Linear form with dependents lowering full 
compensation to women workers and raising full compensation.
Naturally, the conflicting simulation results across functional forms for dependents 
is due to the differing treatment of demographic variables in the compensation formulae. 
The result highlights the extreme sensitivity of the simulation results to the specifications. 
Taken together, the simulation results based on the theoretical specifications tend to be in 
the neighborhood of the standard norm of one-half wage replacement which is 
approximately what states provide for beneficiaries qualifying for less than the maximum 
weekly benefit amount. Results based on the Stone-Geary are slightly below and those 
based on the Linear form are somewhat above half wage replacement. Rather than 
contradict the standard norm of adequacy, these results tend to support the one-half wage 
replacement rule. If the theoretical simulation results raise any questions, they are about 
the best timing of payments.
6. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS.
Results from estimating explicit parameterizations of labor supply have been used 
to compute estimates for full unemployment compensation. The estimates generated were 
compared to hypothetical payments which would accrue under the unemployment insurance 
(UI) systems of representative states. Results on compensation amounts tend to support 
the accepted standard of UI benefit adequacy which calls for replacement of one-half of 
lost wages. While one-half wage replacement over the course of an average 15 week spell
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of unemployment appears to yield adequate and not excessive wage replacement, return to 
work incentives might be improved if the fixed nature of the weekly payment is examined. 
There may be ways to maintain or improve benefit adequacy while speeding return to 
work. This might be accomplished in part by a closer examination of partial benefit rules.
The direct compensation and state program simulations imply that current UI 
programs overcompensate for wage loss during short spells of unemployment, and 
under-compensate for lengthy spells. Overall, compensation is adequate in the present UI 
system, but the timing of payments should be more closely examined. Particular program 
features to consider are the length and timing of the waiting period.
Findings in this study concerning dependents allowances were extremely cloudy. 
The two different theoretical specifications produced opposite results. What the results 
suggested was that dependents affect required compensation to men and women in exactly 
opposite ways regardless of the household setting where the man or woman lives. It may 
require Solomon to craft a benefit policy which treats men and women differently in terms 
of dependents, and is still politically acceptable.
For the 12 different types of representative worker considered in this study, benefit 
simulations were performed for four representative states: Michigan, Massachusetts, 
Illinois, and Oregon. Among the 48 cases examined at least one-half of lost weekly 
earnings would be replaced during a week of unemployment in 24 of the cases. Clearly, 
each of the 48 cases is not equally likely to occur in practice. The four states studied 
differ greatly in size, and the probabilities of unemployment for each of the twelve types 
of household member differ as well. In the simulations one-half wage replacement is most 
likely to occur for women and single men, with dependents allowances greatly increasing 
the chance of one-half wage replacement. In 1993 single Americans were more than twice 
as likely to experience unemployment than were married people, and among women those
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with dependents were more likely to be unemployed. 16 This suggests that unemployment 
is a greater risk for those more likely to be adequately compensated by the UI system.
Since the 1950s a popular standard of unemployment insurance benefit adequacy is 
half wage replacement for eighty percent of the insured unemployed or one-half for four- 
fifths. Given that between the minimum and maximum weekly benefit amounts 
approximately one-half of lost wages are replaced, an important part of benefit adequacy 
concerns maximum benefit amount policy. Obviously raising the maximum weekly benefit 
amount (WBA) would allow one-half wage replacement to extend to more beneficiaries. 
In Table 17 we see that for the six worker types drawn from the 1992 Current Population 
Survey (CPS) and examined in this paper, 17 setting the maximum WBA at two-thirds the 
full sample average weekly wage (AWW) would extend one-half wage replacement to 77 
percent of the population. The maximum WBA would need to be at about 71 percent of 
the AWW to allow one-half for four-fifths. Among working married women with 
husbands not working, the standard of adequacy would be reached with the maximum 
WBA at fifty percent of the AWW, while for working married men with wives not 
working setting the maximum at seventy-five percent of the AWW would still fall short of 
the adequacy standard. Clearly, earnings levels are different for the various categories of 
earners. Table 18 states what maximum WBA combined with fifty percent wage 
replacement below the maximum would yield one-half for four-fifths for each of the six 
categories of worker considered in this study.
Raising the maximum WBA is not a simple matter, adjustments of this parameter 
should always be considered in the larger context of UI trust fund adequacy. As Vroman 
(1990, p. 114) points out "symmetric treatment...of taxes and benefits...helps to reduce the 
risk of insolvency." It is generally believed that if the maximum weekly benefit amount is
16 Data from Table 1 in the 1993 Geographic Profile of Employment and Unemployment 
and Table 626 in the 1994 Statistical Abstract of the United States.
17There are six different worker types when the two alternative dependents possibilities 
are ignored.
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set at two-thirds of the state average weekly wage, one-half wage replacement will be 
achieved for eighty percent of beneficiaries. Regarding maximum benefit amount policy 
Minnesota and Oklahoma should be studied as models. In Oklahoma, for example, the 
maximum weekly benefit amount is adjusted annually to a percentage between 60 and 67 
percent of the state average weekly wage depending on the state UI trust fund balance.
While it was mentioned in this paper when reviewing earlier research but not 
analyzed, benefit adequacy also concerns those with low levels of prior earnings. Because 
"necessary and obligated" expenditures amount to a larger share of earnings for low 
income people, one-half wage replacement may be inadequate for this group. Programs 
which tie the minimum weekly benefit amount (WBA) to the maximum WBA amount 
should be closely examined. Kansas, where the minimum WBA is set at 25 percent of the 
maximum WBA, offers a useful approach to minimum WBA policy.
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Figure 2. A graphic representation of full unemployment 





Average UI Weekly Benefit Amount (WBA), 


















































































































































































* Source: UI Financial Data, ET Handbook No. 394, United States Department of Labor, Employment 
and Training Administration (1992). Figures for 1993 and 1994 averaged from the four 
quarterly issues of UI Data Summary, United States Department of Labor, Employment and 
Training Administration (1993, 1994).
Table 2
State Wage Replacement Ratio (WRR), 1994
State Maximum Weekly Benefit Amount (MWBA), Jan 1993
as a Fraction of State Average Weekly Wage (AWW), 1992



























































































































































































































































Experience of Single UI Beneficiaries 














PCTGWb PCTNWC PCTNDd PCTMAX6 WRRf SWRR*
28 65 95 21 .46 .31
51 84 118 37 .56 .36
51 72 114 46 .54 .34
52 79 118 42 .58 .39
34 58 106 49 .48 .33
Becker (1980), Table 1, pp. 11-12.
Percent of beneficiaries whose benefits were half or more of their gross wage.
Percent of beneficiaries whose benefits were half or more of their net wage.
Average benefit as a percent of average non-deferrable expenditures.
Percent of beneficiaries who received the maximum benefit amount.
Ratio of average weekly benefit amount in state to average weekly net wage of recipients.
Ratio of average weekly benefit amount in state to average weekly wage in state covered
employment.
Table 4
Means of Characteristics of the Samples Selected from the
1992 Current Population Survey Annual Demographic File by Household Type










































































Education (Proportion in Category)
8 years or less
























































































































































Labor Supply Equation Regression Results by Household Type 












Predicted Hourly Wage (I/v)




























































Predicted Hourly Wage (v)

































































Wage Equation Regression Results by Household Type 
(standard errors in parentheses)
Household Type
Married Both Working








(Omit 8 years or less)





























































































































































Stone-Geary Utility Function Parameter Estimates by Household Type 

















































































a - Share of full budget devoted to leisure.
7, - Minimum leisure required before utility is defined.
72 - Minimum income required before utility is defined.
d - Minimum leisure required per dependent.
A = SD - Minimum leisure (non-market time) required for dependents.
Table 8
Partial Effect and Elasticity Estimates of Labor Supply Implied by the
Stone-Geary Utility Function for Various Household Types





















































































































* (dH/dw) = Cournot wage effect
b (dH/dl) = pure income effect
c S = substitution effect = (dH/dw) - H(dH/dI)
d O?H.W) = wage elasticity = (dH/dw)(w/H)
" (TJ H 0 = income elasticity = (dH/dI)(I/H)
f (*?*H.W) = substitution elasticity
Table 9
Partial Effect and Elasticity Estimates of Labor Supply Implied by the 




















































































































a (3H/dw) = Cournot wage effect
b (dH/dl) = pure income effect
c S = substitution effect = (3H/dw) - H(3H/3I)
d (IH.W) = wage elasticity = (dH/dw)(w/H)
6 (%.i) = income elasticity = (3H/ai)(I/H)
f O?SH.W) = substitution elasticity
Table 10
Benefit Rights Provisions in the State UI Laws 




Base Period (BP) 52 weeks preceding 
BY
Earnings to Qualify 20x30x min. wage
Employment to 20 weeks in BP 
Qualify
Weekly Benefit 0.7 x Net AWW 
Amount (WBA)
Min-Max WBA $59 - $276










Number of dependents 
is taken into account 









1/21 to 1/26 
of HQ earnings 
+ dependant's 
allowance
















49% of 2 highest 
quarters / 26






5% of 2 highest 
quarters divided 
by 26.
* Source: U.S. Department of Labor (1992), "Comparison of State Unemployment Insurance Laws", 
Administration, Unemployment Insurance Service, January.
BY: Benefit Year
WBA: Weekly Benefit Amount 
BP: Base Period





1st 4 of last 5 
quarters
$1,000 in BP











Unemployment Compensation Simulation Estimates in Dollars 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































These results were computed using mean values of the hourly wage rate (w=$14.89) and family non-labor income (I=$2,867) from the sample of 11,739 husbands with working wives.
Weeks = Number of weeks unemployed in the year.
Michigan = Compensation payable in Michigan, an Average Weekly Wage State. 
Massachusetts = Compensation payable in Massachusetts a High-quarter State. 
Illinois = Compensation payable in Illinois, a Multi-quarter State.
Oregon = Compensation payable in Oregon, an Annual Wage State.
Half = Half of lost wages.
Stone-Geary = Full compensation at the means given the Stone-Geary Utility Function.
Linear = Full compensation at the means given the Linear Labor Supply Function.
Table 12
Unemployment Compensation Simulation Estimates in Dollars 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































These results were computed using mean values of the hourly wage rate (w=$10.64) and family non-labor income (I=$2,867) from the sample of 11,739 husbands with working wives.
Weeks = Number of weeks unemployed in the year.
Michigan = Compensation payable in Michigan, an Average Weekly Wage State. 
Massachusetts = Compensation payable in Massachusetts a High-quarter State. 
Illinois = Compensation payable in Illinois, a Multi-quarter State.
Oregon = Compensation payable in Oregon, an Annual Wage State.
Half = Half of lost wages.
Stone-Geary = Full compensation at the means given the Stone-Geary Utility Function.
Linear = Full compensation at the means given the Linear Labor Supply Function.
Table 13
Unemployment Compensation Simulation Estimates in Dollars 

































































































































































































































































































































































































These results were computed using mean values of the hourly wage rate (w=$16.47) and family non-labor income (I=$6,361) from the sample of 6,153 husbands with non-working wives.
Weeks = Number of weeks unemployed in the year.
Michigan = Compensation payable in Michigan, an Average Weekly Wage State. 
Massachusetts = Compensation payable in Massachusetts a High-quarter State. 
Illinois = Compensation payable in Illinois, a Multi-quarter State.
Oregon = Compensation payable in Oregon, an Annual Wage State.
Half = Half of lost wages.
Stone-Geary = Full compensation at the means given the Stone-Geary Utility Function.
Linear = Full compensation at the means given the Linear Labor Supply Function.
Table 14
Unemployment Compensation Simulation Estimates in Dollars 
for Married Women with a Non-working Spouse*
Weeks Michigan Massachusetts
No Dependents 
Illinois Oregon Half Stone-Geary Linear Michigan Massachusetts
Two Dependents 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































These results were computed using mean values of the hourly wage rate (w=$10.50) and family non-labor income (I=$10,297) from the sample of 2,505 wives with non-working husbands.
Weeks = Number of weeks unemployed in the year.
Michigan = Compensation payable in Michigan, an Average Weekly Wage State. 
Massachusetts = Compensation payable in Massachusetts a High-quarter State. 
Illinois = Compensation payable in Illinois, a Multi-quarter State.
Oregon = Compensation payable in Oregon, an Annual Wage State.
Half = Half of lost wages.
Stone-Geary = Full compensation at the means given the Stone-Geary Utility Function.
Linear = Full compensation at the means given the Linear Labor Supply Function.
Table 15






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































a These results were computed using mean values of the hourly wage rate (w=$13.24) and family non-labor income (I=$l,862) from the sample of 6,031 single males.
Weeks = Number of weeks unemployed in the year.
Michigan = Compensation payable in Michigan, an Average Weekly Wage State. 
Massachusetts = Compensation payable in Massachusetts a High-quarter State. 
Illinois = Compensation payable in Illinois, a Multi-quarter State.
Oregon = Compensation payable in Oregon, an Annual Wage State.
Half = Half of lost wages.
Stone-Geary = Full compensation at the means given the Stone-Geary Utility Function.
Linear = Full compensation at the means given the Linear Labor Supply Function.
Table 16




Illinois Oregon Half Stone-Geary Linear Michigan Massachusetts
Two Dependents 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































These results were computed using mean values of the hourly wage rate (w=$10.51) and family non-labor income (I=$2,394) from the sample of 7,026 single females.
Weeks = Number of weeks unemployed in the year.
Michigan = Compensation payable in Michigan, an Average Weekly Wage State. 
Massachusetts = Compensation payable in Massachusetts a High-quarter State. 
Illinois = Compensation payable in Illinois, a Multi-quarter State.
Oregon = Compensation payable in Oregon, an Annual Wage State.
Half = Half of lost wages.
Stone-Geary = Full compensation at the means given the Stone-Geary Utility Function.
Linear = Full compensation at the means given the Linear Labor Supply Function.
Table 17
Proportion of Sub-sample with One-half Earnings Replaced 
when the Maximum Weekly Benefit Amount (WBA) is Set at 
Various Fractions of the Full-sample Average Weekly Wage
(AWW=$519)
Married Both Married One Working
Working 
Fraction













































































Maximum Weekly Benefit Amount (WBA) Required for 
Each Sub-sample to Yield One-half for Four-Fifths
Married Both Working Married One Working 
Husbands Wives Husbands Wives
Single 
Males Females
442 279 500 260 375 302
Total
375



